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RESUMÉ

OF

Operations Against Apache Indians.

1882 TO 1886.

BY

BRIGADIER GEN'L GEORGE CROOK,

U. S. ARMY.

1886.

Pamphlet Collection
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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,

Omaha, Nebraska, December 27, 1886.

*The Adjutant General, U. S. Army,
Washington, D. C.*

SIR:

As the Chiricahua Apache campaign has ended with the surrender of Geronimo, Mangus, Natchez and Chihuahua, with their followers, and as the official reports connected therewith have been submitted and published, in view of my long service in connection with the troubles of which these Indians were the cause, I deem it proper to submit the following resume of operations in Arizona, for the information of the War Department, to be published and then placed on file, as a part of the history of our Indian troubles in that Territory.

An experience obtained in eight years of service in Arizona enables me to speak with a certain authority on this question, and justifies the forwarding of this paper on a subject which, during the past year, has attracted no small degree of public attention and interest.

Upon assuming command of the Department of Arizona, in 1882, a careful and thorough investigation revealed the existence of anything but a satisfactory state of affairs. The Indians generally were sullen, and distrustful of all white men; many were on the verge of war, and some were in open hostilities. There was a general feeling of uneasiness among the whites, and the business interests of the Territory were paralyzed by the uncertainties of the situation.

Since my departure from the Territory in 1875, its property interests had largely increased in value, and these interests and the lives of citizens engaged in peaceful pursuits, demanded protection.

Such being the condition of affairs, it was therefore required of any line of policy adopted, that it be directed to the attainment of three main objects:—the maintenance of control over the Indians remaining on the reservations, the protection of life and property of citizens, and the subjugation of the hostiles.

The first of these objects would undoubtedly be attained, in the

most permanent and satisfactory way, could the Indians themselves be brought up to a degree of civilization sufficient to render them harmless to settlers, self-sustaining and subordinate to authority. To raise and elevate the condition of the Indian himself, was the object to which my first attention was directed.

Fortunately, I was able to command the respect and confidence of the Indians then on the reservation, and who had been under my control in 1871-75. It was essential not only that this confidence in me should be retained, but to produce the best and most lasting results, that it should also be extended to the whites generally.

As a first step to this end, the following order was published to the troops of the Département:

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA,

WHIPPLE BARRACKS, PRESCOTT, A. T., *October 5, 1882.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 43. }

The Commanding General, after making a thorough and exhaustive examination among the Indians of the eastern and southern part of this Territory, regrets to say that he finds among them a general feeling of distrust, and want of confidence in the whites—especially the soldiery; and also that much dissatisfaction, dangerous to the peace of the country, exists among them.

Officers and soldiers serving in this Department are reminded that one of the fundamental principles of the military character is, justice to all—Indians as well as white men—and that a disregard of this principle is likely to bring about hostilities, and cause the death of the very persons whom they are sent here to protect.

In all their dealings with the Indians, officers must be careful not only to observe the strictest fidelity, but to make no promises not in their power to carry out; all grievances, arising within their jurisdiction, should be redressed, so that an accumulation of them may not cause an outbreak. Grievances, however petty, if permitted to accumulate, will be like embers that smolder and eventually break into flame.

When officers are applied to for the employment of force against Indians, they should thoroughly satisfy themselves of the necessity for the application, and of the legality of compliance therewith, in order that they may not, through the inexperience of others, or through their own hastiness, allow the troops under them to become the instruments of oppression.

There must be no division of responsibility in this matter; each officer will be held to a strict accountability that his actions have been fully authorized by law and justice, and that Indians evincing a desire to enter upon a career of peace shall have no cause for complaint through hasty or injudicious acts of the military.

BY ORDER OF BRIGADIER GENERAL CROOK:

[Signed.] J. P. MARTIN,
Ass't Adjutant General."

But this alone would do little; the Indians themselves had to be reached, and authority established over them, before they could in any way be controlled, or their condition advanced beyond the primitive savagery in which they existed.

Some of the leaders of the different bands were interviewed, and were, by various means, induced to exert their influence for the maintenance of order. These Indians the more readily yielded to control because of their previous acquaintance with me in 1871-75, when I had subjugated and placed over five thousand of them on the reservation. But the Chiricahua and Warm Spring Apaches, during my former administration in Arizona, had been excepted from my control, and had escaped the punishment due them for their outrages.

The Chiricahuas had been given a reservation south of the present line of the Southern Pacific Railway, on the borders of Mexico. I was prohibited from interfering in any manner with their management, and was not able even to learn the terms upon which this reservation was given to them.

The reservation of the Warm Spring Apaches was in New Mexico at the Ojo Caliente, and therefore outside the limits of my command. Subsequently some members of these bands were induced to remove to the White Mountain Reservation, but prior to my re-assignment to the command in 1882, they had all left it, and were located in the Sierra Madre in Mexico, where their presence was a constant menace to the people living within the territory subject to their depredations, which extended on both sides of the international boundary. While these Indians remained off the reservations, life and property within the exposed limits would be unsafe, and it was determined to effect their return.

The raid of Chatto in March, 1883, enabled me, without violation of treaty stipulations, to follow this band to the Chiricahua strongholds in the Sierra Madre.

The details of this expedition were fully set forth in my annual report for 1883, and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to state that it resulted in the surrender of all the renegades—not only those who had at any time lived on the reservation, but also those who, when their bands had been moved from the Warm Springs and Chiricuhua Reservations to the White Mountain Reserve, had escaped to the Sierra Madre. In compliance with the surrender then made, over 600 souls, 120 being men and boys capable of bearing arms, were brought to the reservation, their status being nominally that of prisoners of war. At this time, the Chiricahuas were the wildest and fiercest Indians on the continent; savage and brutal by instinct, they hesitated no more at taking human life, when excited by passion, than in killing a rabbit. For more than two centuries they had been a thorn in the flesh of the Spaniards, and although during this time, almost constant warfare had been carried on, all efforts to conquer these tigers of the human race by force of arms, had been fruitless.

For centuries the Apaches had been subjected to hardships and privations which began with their birth and ended only with their lives. The mountain country in which they lived furnished all that was necessary for their existence. The advance of a people to even the simplest form of civilization is marked by the creation of artificial necessities. The Apache was independent of these, and his contact with the whites led him to adopt only their weapons. They resented anything like an attempt to regulate their conduct, or in any way to interfere with their mode of life.

The problem presented was to bring under control, reduce to subordination, and civilize, so far as was possible, these Indians, to whose restive natures, restraint of any kind was unknown. In accepting their surrender, I was deeply sensible of the responsibility which I assumed, but I believed then, and believe now, that in no other way could I hope to put an end to the constant raids to which Arizona and New Mexico had, for generations, been subjected by these Indians. Their regeneration could be a work only of time, and of the most patient watchfulness and care.

They were placed under the charge of officers in whose ability and discretion I reposed great confidence. Confidential Indians were employed as secret service scouts, and kept constantly in the camps of the savages, to observe their every movement, to listen to their conversation and report their demeanor. Indians of their own tribe were selected, preferably the most influ-

ential and energetic of their number, who were enlisted and paid as scouts, and every effort was made to gain their confidence and secure their co-operation. By this means, the several bands were disintegrated, divisions created among them and, by degrees, a following obtained that was interested in repressing disorder. This step gained, it became possible to go farther, and, by exercising the greatest discretion, to punish offenders. Whenever it was practicable, this was caused to be done by the Indians themselves, and in this way several of the prominent young "bucks" were arrested while fomenting discontent, tried by Indian juries, by them sentenced and severely punished. Disorders repressed in this way not only accustomed them to a certain degree of self government, but were most invaluable in cultivating a spirit of subordination among them. By these and other methods, too numerous to describe here, and which have been set forth more in detail in my annual, and other reports, for 1883-84-85, these wild and reckless spirits were brought under control, and were gradually set at work farming, in which the labor was performed not only by the women, but also by the men. This, too, was accomplished without violent shock to their prejudices, and without exciting their suspicions.

It is impossible to estimate the discouraging effect of the obstacles, against which it was necessary to contend in following out these methods to a finally successful issue; the unfriendly criticism of the Territorial press, the more or less open and always covert opposition of the Indian Department, up to the time of the outbreak in 1885; the undisguised hostility of the numerous rings of contractors and speculators, whose success depended upon their ability to defraud the Indians; all these adverse elements had to be overcome, and against such odds, success would have been impossible, except for the zealous co-operation of such men as Captain Crawford, Lieutenant Gatewood, Lieutenant Britton Davis, and others associated with them in the management of Indian affairs on the White Mountain Reservation. These officers constantly carried their lives in their hands; the service in which they were engaged was one of the greatest possible delicacy and danger, where the slightest indiscretion would have proved fatal to them. But it seemed, in my judgment, the only way in which the Indians could be reached and taught that subordination to authority, which is an essential requisite to any degree of advancement, however slight, toward a state of civilization. For this reason I allowed officers, the value of whose lives was inestimable, to engage in the most dangerous duty that ever falls to the lot of soldiers to perform.

The method indicated above had been applied with success to the management of the other Apaches who, it should be remembered, were in 1871, in all respects as brutally savage as these Chiricahuas were in 1883, and there was every reason to believe that the same means which had proved so effective with the former, would produce equally good results with the latter; and they did, in fact. For the first time in their history, they were placed under restraint and taught subordination, while at the same time they made rapid progress toward self-government, and complete self-support. For more than two years Arizona and New Mexico enjoyed a respite from Indian troubles, during which period not an outrage or depredation of any kind was committed in the United States by an Apache Indian. This was the first time, within the memory of man, that there were no Apache Indians on the war-path. During this period the question of the management of the Chiricahuas was practically settled. I had gained their confidence to such an extent that I am firmly convinced that had I known of the occurrences reported in Lieutenant Davis' telegram of May 15, 1885, which I did not see until months afterwards, the outbreak of Mangus and Geronimo, a few days later, would not have occurred. As it was, though nearly all the prominent chiefs except Chatto were among the renegades, less than one-third of the fighting strength left the reservation. Over eighty men and three hundred and fifty women and children still remained on their farms. Although the hard and conscientious work expended upon these Chiricahuas did not prevent a portion of them leaving the reservation, it enabled me to select with certainty of faithful service, fifty of those remaining, for enlistment as scouts. I should have enlisted more, except for the reason, that I wished the rest to remain, to protect the women and children from hostile raids. These Indians were selected as scouts, in preference to those belonging to other bands of the Apaches, for the reasons that they were thoroughly familiar with the country in which they would be required to operate; they were superior as soldiers to any other Indians, and fully up to the standard of the renegades.

It is not my purpose in this paper to present the details of operations against the hostile Chiricahuas, as they have already been fully discussed in my annual reports for 1885 and 1886, to which attention is invited. As, however, the surrender of the renegades to me in March 1886, has been made the subject of much discussion in the public press, and indeed has, in some quarters, been curiously misrepresented, it is deemed proper to insert in full, the following correspondence relating thereto:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA.

*In the Field, Fort Bowie, A. T., September 17, 1885.**The Adjutant General,**Division of the Pacific.*

SIR:

It has been my intention to turn over to the civil authorities any hostile bucks captured, for trial under the provisions of Sec. 9, of the Act of Congress, approved March 3, 1885, with reference to jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses committed by Indians. But upon consultation with several prominent lawyers on the subject, I am assured that it will be impossible to secure conviction in the civil courts, owing to the impossibility of obtaining evidence against individual Indians, and that the same difficulty will be experienced in obtaining proof should the Indians be indicted for conspiracy. Unless aided by some stroke of good fortune, it will take years to kill all these hostiles situated as they are, and so long as any of them remain out in the mountains, life and property will be unsafe within their reach and it will be impossible to prevent their depredations.

It is desirable to have them surrender and this they will not do if they think they are to be killed, or what they believe is worse, turned over to the civil authorities.

It is believed they could be induced to surrender after a little more hammering, if they are assured that their lives would not be forfeited and that they would simply be transported. Please give decision by telegraph.

It is important that this matter should not gain publicity, so as to get to the ears of the Indians.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.)

GEORGE CROOK,

*Brigadier General,**Commanding.*

In reply to this letter, the following telegram was received October 8th, 1885:

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION PACIFIC,

*Presido San Francisco, California, October 8, 1885.**General Crook,**Fort Bowie, A. T.*

The following dispatch is repeated for your information and action. Please acknowledge receipt.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL POPE:

(Sgd.) TAYLOR,
Aide-de-Camp.

“Referring to General Crook’s application, dated September “seventeenth, inquiring whether promise can be made to hostile “Chiricahuas that their lives shall not be forfeited if they surrender, “the Secretary of War approves a recommendation of the Lieutenant “General that General Crook be authorized to secure the surrender “of the Chiricahuas now at large upon terms of their being held as “prisoners of war, but it must be understood that any negotiation “looking to their surrender must include all hostile Chiricahuas, “and that as soon as the surrender is made that they at once be “sent under suitable guard for confinement at Fort Marion, Fla. “Please so inform General Crook by telegraph and direct him to “acknowledge receipt. No publicity must be given as to the “intentions of the Government in this matter beyond what is “absolutely necessary in communicating with the Indians.

“(Sgd.) R. C. DRUM,
“*Adjutant General.*”

After the receipt of information of Crawford’s fight, his subsequent death, and the request of the hostiles for a personal interview with me, the following dispatch was received:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,

Washington, D. C., February 1st, 1886.

General George Crook,

Fort Bowie, Arizona.

I had a consultation with the President last Thursday afternoon on the subject of Lieutenant Maus’ dispatch. He fully understands the instructions under which you can act transmitted to you September 30, 1885, but desires me to notify you to make no promises at all to the hostiles, unless it is necessary to secure their surrender.

(Sgd.) P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant General.

In compliance with the authority contained in the above communications, I proceeded to the point where the Indians were in

camp, and on March 25th, 1886, had my first interview with them. A full report of the conference is attached to my report of operations against the hostile Chiricahuas, marked "M", to which reference is made. I found the hostiles, though tired of the constant hounding of the campaign, in superb physical condition, armed to the teeth, and with an abundance of ammunition. In manner they were suspicious, and at the same time independent and self-reliant. After my first interview, I telegraphed the Lieutenant General as follows:

CAMP EL CANON DE LOS EMBUDOS,

Twenty miles S. E. San Bernardino, Mexico, March 26, 1886.

Via Fort Bowie, Arizona, March 28, 1886.

Lieut. General P. H. Sheridan,

Washington, D. C.

I met the hostiles yesterday at Lt. Maus' Camp, they being located about five hundred yards distant. I found them very independent and as fierce as so many tigers,—knowing what pitiless brutes they are themselves they mistrust every one else. After my talk with them it seemed as if it would be impossible to get any hold on them except on conditions that they be allowed to return to the reservation on their old status. To-day things look more favorable.

(Sgd.)

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier General.

That evening spies managed to get among them, and in this way their feelings both toward each other, and toward their pursuers were ascertained. On information gained in this way it was possible to shape a policy. Though it is believed that all the hostiles had implicit confidence in me, I preferred to work on individuals, and selected Chihuahua and Natchez, who were the most influential leaders of the renegades, and concentrated my efforts upon them. From the scouts were selected trustworthy Indians of their own tribe, who were carefully instructed, and sent to talk with these chiefs, who finally agreed to surrender, on terms the most favorable I could hope to exact. This at once divided the hostiles into two parties, and broke up the band. The fact that this had been effected through the personal efforts of their own people, had an effect not only of a peculiarly demoralizing nature upon the hostiles, but also upon all others of the tribe, and rendered their subsequent management anywhere, an easy matter. Before this, merely to have hinted at the

possibility of their removal from their old haunts would simply have stampeded the whole tribe to the mountains.

These results may be traced directly to the work that had been done among these Indians during the two years they had been on the reservation, and were followed on the next day by the surrender of the whole body of hostiles, which fact was communicated to the Lieutenant General in the following telegram:

CAMP EL CANON DE LOS EMBUDOS, MEXICO,

March 27th, 1886, via Fort Bowie, Arizona, March 29th, 1886.

Lt. General P. H. Sheridan, U. S. A.,

Washington, D. C.

Confidential.

In a conference with Geronimo and other Chiricahuas, I told them that they must decide at once upon unconditional surrender or fight it out. That in the latter event hostilities should be commenced at once and the last one of them killed if it took fifty years. I told them to reflect on what they were to do before giving me their answer. The only propositions they would entertain were these three. That they should be sent east for not exceeding two (2) years, taking with them such of their families as so desired, leaving at Apache, Nana who is 70 years old and superannuated; or that they should all return to the reservation on their old status; or else return to the war path with its attendant horrors. As I had to act at once, I have to-day accepted their surrender upon the first proposition.

Ka-e-te-na, the young chief, who less than two years ago was the worst Chiricahua of the whole lot, is now perfectly subdued. He is thoroughly reconstructed, has rendered me valuable assistance, and will be of great service in helping to control these Indians in the future. His stay at Alcatraz has worked a complete reformation in his character. I have not a doubt that similar treatment will produce same results with the whole band and by the end of that time, the excitement will have died away. Mangus with thirteen (13) Chiricahuas, six* (6) of whom are bucks, is not with the other Chiricahuas. He separated from them in August last and has since held no communication with them. He has committed no depredations. As it would be likely to take at least a year to find him in the immense ranges of mountains to the south, I think it inadvisable to attempt any search at this time, especially as he will

*There were but 3 men with Mangus, as was ascertained subsequent to the time of writing this telegram.

undoubtedly give himself up as soon as he hears what the others have done.

I start for Bowie to-morrow morning to reach there next night. I respectfully request to be informed whether or not my action has been approved and also that full instructions meet me at that point. The Chiricahuas start for Bowie to-morrow with the Apache Scouts under Lieut. Maus.

(Sgd.) GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier General.

There is not the slightest doubt that their surrender was made in good faith. The fact that Geronimo and Natchez, having been filled with fiery mescal, and alarmed by the lies of a designing man, stampeded on the route to Fort Bowie with a party of their following, was an unfortunate, but not irreparable accident. The men sent to Fort Marion were among the bravest and ablest of the renegades; the old chief Nana, despite his age, was the acknowledged brains of the band, Chihuahua and Josanie were their most influential leaders; while among the prisoners were two wives and three children of Geronimo, the family of Natchez, and also relatives, or some members of the families of all that remained out.

It was only necessary to communicate with the renegades, which, with the aid of the scouts, would have been a matter of but little difficulty when they had recovered from their fright, and had time to consider the position in which they were placed, and the trouble would, in all probability, have been settled without further bloodshed. This course would have been adopted, but my relief from the command of the Department prevented such action being taken.

The voluntary return of two of the Indians who had been stampeded on this occasion, is a very significant fact when considered with reference to this line of policy. *

The following telegraphic correspondence shows clearly all remaining facts connected with the surrender of the hostiles:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA,

In the Field, Fort Bowie, A. T., March 30th, 1886.

Lieut. General P. H. Sheridan,

Washington, D. C.

A courier just in from Lieutenant Maus reports that during last night Geronimo and Natchez with twenty men and thirteen women

*In communication of April 4, *infra* p. 17.

left his camp taking no stock. He states that there was no apparent cause for their leaving. Two dispatches received from him this morning reported everything going on well and the Chiricahuas in good spirits. Chihuahua and twelve men remained behind. Lieut. Maus with his scouts, except enough to take the other prisoners to Bowie, have gone in pursuit.

(Sgd.) GEORGE CROOK,
 Brigadier General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,

Washington, D. C., March 30th, 1886.

Telegram.

*General George Crook,
Fort Bowie, Arizona.*

You are confidentially informed that your telegram of March 29th is received. The President cannot assent to the surrender of the hostiles on the terms of their imprisonment East for two years with the understanding of their return to the reservation. He instructs you to enter again into negotiations on the terms of their unconditional surrender, only sparing their lives. In the meantime and on the receipt of this order you are directed to take every precaution against the escape of the hostiles, which must not be allowed under any circumstances. You must make at once such disposition of your troops as will insure against further hostilities by completing the destruction of the hostiles, unless these terms are acceded to.

(Sgd.) P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

Washington, D. C., March 31st, 1886.

Telegram.

*General George Crook,
Fort Bowie, Arizona.*

Your dispatch of yesterday received. It has occasioned great disappointment. It seems strange that Geronimo and party could have escaped without the knowledge of the scouts.

(Sgd.) P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA.

In the Field, Fort Bowie, A. T., March 31st, 1886.

*Lieut. General P. H. Sheridan,
Washington, D. C.*

Your dispatch of the thirty-first received. There can be no question that the scouts were thoroughly loyal and would have prevented the hostiles leaving had it been possible. When they left their camp with our scouts they scattered over the country so as to make surprise impossible and they selected their camp with this in view, nor would they all remain in camp at one time. They kept more or less full of mescal. They had so tamed down since we first met them that some of the most prominent were hunting their ponies unarmed the evening of the night they left.

(Sgd.) GEORGE CROOK,
 Brigadier General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

Washington, D. C., March 31st, 1886.

Telegram.

*General George Crook,
Fort Bowie, Arizona.*

You have not acknowledged receipt of my telegram of March 30th conveying instructions of the President. Inform me at once of this and telegraph me any further information you may have of the escape of the hostiles and the prospects of their recapture.

(Sgd.) P. H. SHERIDAN,
 Lieutenant General.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA.

In the Field, Fort Bowie, A. T., March 31st, 1886.

*Lieut. General P. H. Sheridan,
Washington, D. C.*

In reply to your dispatch of March thirtieth, to enable you to clearly understand situation, it should be remembered that the hostiles had an agreement with Lieut. Maus that they were to be met by me twenty-five miles below the line, that no regular troops were to be present. While I was very averse to such an arrangement, I

had to abide by it as it had already been entered into. We found them in camp on a rocky hill about five hundred yards from Lieut. Maus in such a position that a thousand men could not have surrounded them with any possibility of capturing them. They were able upon the approach of any enemy being signalled to scatter and escape through dozens of ravines and canons which would shelter them from pursuit until they reached the higher ranges in the vicinity. They were armed to the teeth, having the most improved guns and all the ammunition they could carry. The clothing and other supplies lost in the fight with Crawford had been replaced by new blankets and shirts obtained in Mexico. Lieutenant Maus with Apache scouts was camped at the nearest point the hostiles would agree to his approaching. Even had I been disposed to betray the confidence they placed in me, it would have been simply an impossibility to get white troops to that point either by day or by night without their knowledge, and had I attempted to do this the whole band would have stampeded back to the mountains. So suspicious were they that never more than from five to eight of the men came into our camp at one time, and to have attempted the arrest of those would have stampeded the others to the mountains. Even after the march to Bowie began we were compelled to allow them to scatter. They would not march in a body and had any efforts been made to keep them together they would have broken for the mountains. My only hope was to get their confidence on the march through Ka-e-te-na, and other confidential Indians, and finally put them on the cars; and until this was done it was impossible even to disarm them.

(Sgd.)

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier General,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA.

In the Field, Fort Bowie, A. T., March 31st, 1886.

Lieut.-General P. H. Sheridan,
Washington, D. C.

Your dispatch of the thirtieth conveying instructions of the President was received this A. M., and answered as soon as possible. To inform the Indians that the terms on which they surrendered are disapproved would in my judgment not only make it impossible for me to negotiate with them but result in their scattering to the mountains, and I can't at present see any way to prevent it.

There is nothing further to report with reference to the escape of the hostiles, nor is it probable I shall be able to give any positive information until the second or third proximo when I can interview the Indians now en route. Lieut. Maus has eighty scouts and can perhaps remain out a week before he will be obliged to return. While it is possible he may succeed in getting the hostiles to return it is extremely doubtful.

(Sgd.) GEORGE CROOK,
 Brigadier General,
 Commanding.

Telegram received 2:11 p. m.

Washington, D. C., April 1st, 1886.

*General George Crook,
 Fort Bowie, Arizona.*

Your dispatch of March 31st received. I do not see what you can now do except to concentrate your troops at the best points and give protection to the people. Geronimo will undoubtedly enter upon other raids of murder and robbery and as the offensive campaign against him with scouts has failed, would it not be best to take up defensive and give protection to the people and business interests of Arizona and New Mexico. The Infantry might be stationed by companies or certain points requiring protection and the Cavalry patrol between them. You have in your Department 48 companies of Infantry and 40 companies of Cavalry and ought to be able to do a good deal with such a force. Please send me a statement of what you contemplate for the future.

(Sgd.) P. H. SHERIDAN,
 Lieutenant General.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA,

In the Field, Fort Bowie, A. T., April 1st, 1886.

*Lieut.-General P. H. Sheridan,
 Washington, D. C.*

Your dispatch of to-day received. It has been my aim throughout present operations to afford the greatest amount of protection to life and property interests and troops have been stationed accord-

ingly. Troops cannot protect property beyond a radius of one-half mile from their camp. If offensive movements against the Indians are not resumed they may remain quietly in the mountains for an indefinite time without crossing the line and yet their very presence there will be a constant menace and require the troops in this Department to be at all times in position to repel sudden raids; and so long as any remain out they will form a nucleus for disaffected Indians from the different agencies in Arizona and New Mexico, to join. That the operations of the scouts in Mexico have not proved as successful as was hoped, is due to the enormous difficulties they have been compelled to encounter from the nature of the Indians they have been hunting and the character of the country in which they have operated and of which persons not thoroughly conversant with both can have no conception. I believe that the plan upon which I have conducted operations is the one most likely to prove successful in the end. It may be however that I am too much wedded to my own views in this matter, and as I have spent nearly eight years of the hardest work of my life in this Department, I respectfully request that I may be now relieved from its command.

(Sgd.)

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier General.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA,

In the Field, Fort Bowie, A. T., April 2d, 1886.

Confidential.

Lieut.-General P. H. Sheridan,

Washington, D. C.

The hostiles who did not leave with Geronimo arrived to-day, about eighty, I haven't ascertained the exact number, some of the worst of the band are among them. In my judgment they should be sent away at once, as the effect on those still out would be much better than to confine them. After they get to their destination, if they can be shown that their future will be better by remaining than to return, I think there will be but little difficulty in obtaining their consent to remain indefinitely. When sent off a guard should accompany them.

(Sgd.)

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier General.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA,

*In the Field, Fort Bowie, A. T., April 2d, 1886.**Lieut.-General P. H. Sheridan,
Washington, D. C.*

In an interview with the hostiles to-day after they arrived, I learned that bad liquor was at the bottom of the party with Geronimo and Natchez leaving. They are of the opinion that Lieut. Maus stands but little chance of coming up with them.

(Sgd.) GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier General.

Telegram received 3-40-p. m.

*Washington, D. C., April 3d, 1886.**General George Crook,
Fort Bowie, Arizona.*

Your telegram of April second received. Under authority from the Secretary of War you will as soon as practicable arrange for the transportation and subsistence of the Chiricahua prisoners now in your possession at Fort Bowie and send them to Fort Marion, Saint Augustine, Florida, where they will be turned over to the C. O. Saint Francis Barracks as prisoners under the terms directed by the President in my telegram of March thirtieth. Send with them, under suitable officers, a sufficient guard to insure their safety.

(Sgd.) P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA,

*In the Field, Fort Bowie, A. T., April 4th, 1886.**Lieut.-General P. H. Sheridan,
Washington, D. C.*

Two men of the hostiles who left with Geronimo are here having joined Lieut. Maus sixteen miles from this post yesterday and came in with him. They say that they were sleeping together on the night of the stampede and heard the others leaving and went themselves because they thought something wrong. After they got out and it became light they made up their minds that there was no reason for leaving. They saw Lieut. Maus with his scouts following the trail made by the hostiles; after hiding in the mountains for

In the Field, Fort Bowie, A. T., April 4th, 1886.

Lieut.-General P. H. Sheridan.

Your dispatch of April 3d designating Fort Marion as the place of confinement for the hostiles received. Arrangements are being made for their transportation and they will be sent as soon as possible. I shall not inform them that the President has disapproved the terms upon which I accepted their surrender, for the reason that I can communicate nothing to them through interpreter without every one knowing what is said and if the fact was known, it would absolutely prevent the return of any of the others, and unless this war is ended by the surrender of the hostiles it is likely to last for years. The fewer the number that remain out the more difficulty there will be in catching them.

Washington, D. C., April 5th, 1886.

Your telegram of April 4th, received. Your action is approved. It is the desire of the President that the prisoners be sent off without delay. Please inform me when they will be started and the number of men, women and children.

(Sgd.) P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant General.

Telegram received 7-30, p. m.

Washington, D. C., April 5th, 1886.

General George Crook,

Fort Bowie, Arizona.

The present terms not having been agreed to here and Geronimo having broken every condition of the surrender, the Indians now in custody are to be held as prisoners and sent to Fort Marion without reference to previous communications and without in any way consulting their wishes in the matter. This is in addition to my telegram of to-day.

(Sgd.)

P. H. SHERIDAN,

Lieutenant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA,

In the Field, Fort Bowie, A. T., April 7th, 1886.

Lieut.-General P. H. Sheridan,

Washington, D. C.

The Chiricahua prisoners numbering fifteen men, among them Chihuahua, Nana and Josanie, thirty-three women and twenty-nine children left Bowie, Station about four P. M. to-day under charge of Lieut. Richards, Fourth Cavalry, escorted by a company of the Eighth Infantry. Among the men were five of the boldest and ablest of the renegades, and three of them were in the raiding party which did so much killing in November and December. To avoid any possible trouble by reason of their stopping at stated times at stations en route, they were sent by special train as far as San Antonio.

(Sgd.)

GEORGE CROOK,

Brigadier General.

On the 11th of April, in obedience to the orders of the War Dept. dated April 2nd, 1886, I turned over the command of the Department to General Miles.

The policy pursued by me in the operations mentioned above has been criticised as one "of operating almost exclusively with Indian Scouts." I am unwilling that such a summary should be placed on official record without a protest, lest by my silence, I should seem to acquiesce in the justice of a criticism, which would seem to imply that the regular troops at my disposal were not used at all, or were used to little advantage.

A further criticism is implied in the suggestion of the Lieutenant General that the troops be used defensively for the protection of life and property. The hostiles were in Mexico; it was therefore necessary to secure this protection, to prevent, if possible, their re-crossing the line. To attain this end, troops were stationed in detachments along the frontier. To each detachment was assigned five Indian scouts to watch the front and detect the approach of the hostiles. These troops were stationed at every point where it was thought possible for the hostiles to pass. Every trail, every water-hole, from the Patagonia Mountains to the Rio Grande was thus guarded. The troops were under the strictest orders, constantly to patrol this line, each detachment having a particular section of country assigned to its special charge.

In addition to this, a second line was similarly established in rear of the first, both to act as a reserve, and to prevent the passing of any hostiles who might elude the vigilance of the first line. Behind this again were stationed troops on the railroad who might be sent to any desired point on the whole front, forming thus a third line.

The posts of Forts Thomas, Grant and Bayard, with troops stationed at various points on the Gila, at Ash Springs, in the Mogollon Mountains and other places, formed in reality a fourth line.

The approach of the hostiles toward any point on the border was telegraphed to all threatened points and the citizens warned in advance. In no case did the hostiles succeed in passing the first line of troops without detection and pursuit. All troops, wherever stationed, had orders to pursue vigorously, and as long as possible, any hostiles who might come within striking distance. In spite, however of all the efforts of the troops the hostiles did pass these lines and the pursuits that ensued, though they were persistent, indefatigable and untiring, and frequently successful in capturing the Indians' stock, resulted in no other loss to the enemy. Troops never worked harder or more deserved success, but during the entire sixteen months of these operations, not a single man, woman or child of the hostiles was killed or captured by the troops of the regular Army.

It cannot be maintained that the failure of the troops to accomplish more than they did, was due to lack of opportunity, owing to the disposition made of them. The movements of the hostiles gave ample opportunities to the troops, and they did not fail to take advantage of them. They did all that could justly be demanded of any troops.

It will be seen that persistent and constant use was made of the regular troops;—that they were not employed in service for which they were not fitted should certainly not be a reason for an implied censure. For the zeal and energy displayed by them, and for the privations and hardships uncomplainingly endured in pursuing these Indians, too much praise cannot be given them.

But a mere passive defence would not alone suffice to protect citizens or property; as long as the Indians remained at large, there could be no safety. A few of these Chiricahuas, with the ability they had of traveling with almost marvelous rapidity over great distances, could have kept the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico in a state of constant terror. The raid of eleven of these Indians through these Territories in 1885 sufficiently indicates this. The smallness of their number, only rendered their escape easier, and their movements more difficult to detect. Protection must therefore be sought, not only in defensive measures, which could not prevent the passage of the Indians across a line of over a thousand miles in length, and at best could only detect their passage within a short time after it had been effected, but the hostiles must be subjugated and placed under control. Therefore, in addition to the measures above described, two commands, consisting each of a picked troop of cavalry and 100 Indian scouts, were organized to follow the hostiles south of the border. They were reduced to the minimum of impedimenta consistent with the nature of the arduous duty assigned to them, which was to follow the hostiles wherever they went, strike them wherever they were found, and pursue them incessantly until they were killed, captured, or until they should sue for peace. In this service the cavalry, picked though it was, proved to be really an impediment to successful operations, and was subsequently relieved, on the recommendation of the officers in command of these expeditions.

To these mixed commands of picked cavalry and Indian scouts, was specially intrusted the task of subjugating the hostiles.

The use of these scouts, in this way, has been made the subject of adverse criticism, and I desire here to express my convictions with regard to it. Nearly eight years of my life have been spent in Arizona, and much of that time in actual hostilities with Apache Indians. I am therefore entitled to speak from the knowledge gained through experience, and I cannot too strongly assert, that there has never been any success in operations against these Indians, unless Indian scouts were used either as auxiliaries or independent of other support. Regular troops have always failed on

our side of the boundary line, and any apparent success in Mexican operations has been attained by the grossest treachery, the effect of which has been to make the Indians, if possible, even more suspicious and savage than before, and to infuriate them to fresh outrages.

I assert, moreover, without reserve or qualification of any nature, that these Chiricahua scouts, under Chiefs Chatto, Noche and others, did most excellent service, and were of more value in hunting down, and compelling the surrender of the renegades than all other troops engaged in operations against them, combined. The reports circulated to the effect that they were disloyal, and unwilling to fight the renegades are absolutely false. It has been said that the hostiles obtained ammunition, supplies, assistance and reinforcements from the scouts, and from those who remained on the reservation; this statement, in whatever form repeated, is entirely incorrect.

During the whole of the sixteen months following the departure of the renegades, up to their final surrender, they did not receive an addition of a single Apache from the reservation. It is true that the hostiles at several different times obtained cartridges from the bodies of scouts and soldiers whom they had killed; and in other instances considerable amounts in camps which they attacked, as for instance in Guadalupe Canon in June, 1885, when they killed three men belonging to a detachment of Captain Lawton's command, and captured probably two or three thousand rounds of fixed ammunition; and in another instance, when Natchez and other Indians attacked Captain Hatfield's troop in May, 1886.

It has been alleged, that while the Chiricahua scouts could be depended upon to use their best efforts "to capture or induce the surrender of the hostiles, they had no wish to kill their own kindred."

It may well be questioned whether it be the policy of the Government simply and absolutely to kill a number of Indians; or to restore peace, and secure the safety of its citizens. The instructions given to me plainly and specifically authorized me to secure the surrender of the hostiles, without conditions if possible, with conditions if necessary. It was not until my successor assumed command that orders were given "looking to the destruction or capture of the hostiles," simply.

But the facts do not support the theory that the scouts would not kill the hostiles. On the contrary, during the entire course of the operations against them, from May, 1885, to the surrender to General Miles of the party under Natchez and Geronimo in September, 1886, the only hostiles killed or captured were in encounters with

the scouts alone, except two men, one of whom was killed by a White Mountain Indian, near Fort Apache, and the other by an American near Fronteras in Mexico, in March, 1886. During the entire campaign, from first to last, without any exception, every successful encounter with the hostiles was due exclusively to the exertions of Indian scouts, and it is the unanimous testimony of officers commanding scout companies, that the Chiricahuas were the most subordinate, energetic, untiring, and by odds, the most efficient of their commands. The use of Indian scouts was indeed a feature of my policy in dealing with the renegade Apaches, and one which my own experience in former campaigns in Nevada, Idaho, California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona and in the Sioux troubles in 1876 and '77, as well as that of soldiers the world over, afford convincing proof that it is a feature of great value, and that results are obtained by the use of these auxiliaries, that cannot be obtained in any other way. As a military principle, it is not the part of wisdom to neglect an auxiliary force which has proved always useful and at times indispensable. In the military service universally, men have been, so far as possible, assigned to the work they are best qualified to perform. The Chiricahua Apache, both by nature and education, is beyond cavil, better qualified than any one else for the warfare which for years past has been carried on in the mountains of Arizona and Mexico. The use of Indian scouts is therefore dictated by the soundest principles of military policy.

In his annual report for 1886, the Lieutenant General says that he thinks that these scouts "were faithful as far as to try to capture or induce the surrender of the hostiles." On this ground alone, the employment of these scouts would be amply justified. In the same report it is also stated that but for the unfortunate assassination of Captain Crawford by Mexican troops, he would "have terminated the cruel and bloody atrocities which continued thereafter for many months." It is necessary to add to this statement, that Captain Crawford's command consisted of Indian scouts only.

Not only as an efficient fighting force were these scouts valuable. Their employment in communicating with the hostiles, who could never have been reached without their aid, and their services, in bringing about the disintegration and surrender of the hostile bands, were of very great value. Without the use of scouts, the surrender of the Chiricahuas in 1883 would have been impossible. Without them, the surrender of the whole body of the hostiles in March 1886 could not have taken place. Although in this last case, some of them escaped after the surrender, it should not be overlooked that

as its result, and in accordance with its terms, seventy seven of the renegades were sent to Florida, leaving but thirty three men, women and children in the band under Natchez and Geronimo.*

And finally, the surrender to my successor, of this party was accomplished solely by the use, not only of scouts, but of Chiricahua scouts. The report of the Lieutenant General allows the inference to be made that this was due to a departure from the methods employed by me, and resulted from the use exclusively of regular troops. The fact is that after an experience of months, absolutely without gaining one step, during which time troops, horses and pack-trains had been worked beyond the limit of endurance, and citizens, Mexicans, and friendly Indians of other tribes, had been employed in vain. Lieutenant Gatewood with the aid of two Chiricahua Apaches, obtained the surrender. In other words, the campaign was closed only by a return to the methods which constituted the distinctive feature of the policy adopted and followed by me.

It is difficult to arrive at the true conditions accepted by the Indians in this surrender, and the question is of little importance, so far as this discussion goes. One fact, however, is certain, the efforts of the troops in the field, had little or nothing to do with it.

The difficulties and cost, both in life and money, of protracted Indian wars, are too well known to need discussion. They have ever been out of all proportion to the results obtained. The Seminole War, lasting through eight years of constant warfare, cost thousands of lives, and between twenty and thirty millions of dollars.

"The power of the Army aided by deception, fraud and perfidy was tried in vain," but the Seminoles were never conquered by force of arms, and peace was at last obtained with the inauguration of a different policy. The confidence of one of their most powerful chiefs was gained by an act of simple justice, and by means of negotiations carried on through this chief, a portion of them were induced to surrender, with the understanding that they should be moved beyond the Mississippi. The first Indians sent west induced a disposition on the part of those who remained to follow. The wedge had been inserted, and time alone was required to drive it home.

There are many parallel points in the Seminole and Apache Wars, among which may be distinguished as especially pertinent, the difficulty of operating, presented by the natural features of the country.

*Mangus and his party, eleven in number had separated from the others soon after leaving the reservation, and had taken no part, so far as can be learned, in any of the outrages committed by the renegades.

In both cases it was almost impossible, to get within striking distance of the hostiles. It was the ability on the part of the Indians to evade their pursuers which prolonged the Seminole War, and the Apaches possessed the same advantage, although in a very much greater degree. In the Seminole War, the force of arms and fighting accomplished little more than the destruction of the Indian villages and their contents, and the capture of women and children. After many years of costly war, negotiation succeeded where arms had failed. The same is true of the Apache campaign, except that from the first the utility of negotiation, through and by means of the Indians themselves, was recognized. As in the Seminole, so in the Apache war, the surrendered Indians were sent to a distant part of the country. In one case as in the other, the ties of friendship, and love for kindred, wives and children, were the strong incentives which induced the Indians who remained out to surrender.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,


GEORGE CROOK,

*Brigadier General,
Commanding.*









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